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Abstract 
This article contributes to the debate on hedge funds and exchange rates in 
Thailand and Malaysia. It examines causal relations using a new Granger non-
causality procedure proposed by Toda and Yamamoto (Journal of Econometrics, 
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January, 1994 to April, 2002. The results show that the funds lead Thai baht for 
the crisis period. The results also reveal that the funds lead Malaysian ringgit for 
the pre-crisis period.   
 
 
JEL Classification: G2, C5, F3  
 
Keywords: Hedge Funds, Exchange Rates, Granger Non-Causality. 
 
Affiliation:  * Department of Economics, 
Universiti Putra Malaysia,  
43400 Selangor,  
Malaysia. 
 
Words:  1800  
 
Correspondence: Wan Azman Saini Wan Ngah (W.N.W. Azman-Saini),  
Economics Division (PGR),  
School of Social Science,  
University of Southampton,  
Southampton  
SO17 1BJ, UK.  
E-mail: wazman@soton.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
HEDGE FUNDS, EXCHANGE RATES AND CAUSALITY:  
EVIDENCE FROM THAILAND AND MALAYSIA 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There is increasing interest in the activity of hedge funds. In recent years, there 
were several events associated with hedge funds activities. The attack on the 
sterling in 1992, the global bond rally in 1993, the Asian currency crisis of 1997 
and the Long Term Capital Management crisis were few examples. Compared to 
other investment institutions, hedge funds have no restriction on the use of 
leverage, short-selling and derivatives than the more regulated investment 
institutions. This allows them to follow investment strategies that are 
significantly different from that of traditional investment institutions. 
 
Despite a series of earlier events linked to hedge funds, it was not until 
the Asian currency crisis that regulators took active interest in their activities. 
The crisis which witnessed massive and abrupt falls of Asian currencies had led 
Mahathir Mohamad (i.e. former Prime Minister of Malaysia) to voice out his 
displeasure on hedge funds activities for selling short the currencies and brought 
significant pressure on them (Mohamad, 1997). The funds are also criticized for 
dealing in thin markets with substantial volume, herding, colluding and 
manipulating. Although recent studies fail to find evidence that hedge funds 
were responsible for the crisis, an interview with Stanley Druckermiller (i.e. 
former head of the Quantum Fund) revealed that there were short positions in 
the baht and ringgit.1   
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The Quantum’s year-to-date returns climbed from 3.2% at the end of the first quarter to 22% as of 
Sept. 3, 1997 (Wall Street Journal, Sept. 5, 1997, p. C1). 
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A few studies have assessed the link between hedge funds and exchange 
rates. Most of the studies focused on estimating individual funds exposure by 
inferring their position from return data. For example, using monthly data on 27 
funds, Fung and Hsieh (2000) observe that most of them had a sizeable gain in 
July 1997 when the Thai baht was devalued. However, they conclude that the 
gain was attributed to long positions in the US equity market. 2 Brown et al. 
(1998) examine whether the funds prompted the crisis by taking short positions 
in Asian currencies. Using the Sharpe-style analysis and a sample of ten global 
funds, they find that the aggregate exposure of the funds to the ringgit varied 
considerably. However, there was no relationship between the estimated 
changes in funds exposure and the changes in the value of the currency. 
Eichengreen et al. (1998) argue that there is little evidence to believe that funds 
are more likely to overwhelm a market than other large traders such as 
commercial banks, investment banks, insurance companies, and corporations. 
The funds are not able to manipulate a market than any of these entities and 
there is no evidence that funds used positive feedback trading strategies during 
the crisis in 1997. Brealy and Kaplanis (2001), however, argue that fund’s 
exposures which are inferred from fund’s return should be interpreted 
cautiously. As the funds are commonly thought to make frequent changes in 
their exposures, the estimated coefficient should be interpreted as fund’s average 
exposures over the estimation period.  
 
This article contributes to the literature on the relationship between hedge 
funds and exchange rates in two aspects. First, this study extends the literature 
by examining the causal relationship between hedge funds and exchange rates.  
Existing studies focus mainly on estimating the individual fund’s exposure on 
currencies. Nevertheless, the interest of researchers is not only to assess their 
                                                 
2
 They also found that the funds exposure were significant during the ERM crisis in 1992, the global 
bond rally in 1993/1994. However, the funds exposures were insignificant during the stock market 
crash of 1987 and the Mexican peso crisis in 1994. 
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exposure, but they are more likely to know the causal patterns between these 
two variables. For instance, do hedge funds activities lead currencies 
depreciation? However, this question remains unanswered and therefore, this 
study fills the gap.  Secondly, this study utilizes a new methodology which 
allows causal inferences to be conducted in a system including time series 
processes that may be integrated as well as cointegrated. Toda and Yamamoto 
(1995) provide a simplistic approach for assessing causal relations regardless of 
order of integration and/or the cointegration rank in a VAR system. This 
methodological approach is useful because it bypasses the need for potentially 
biased pre-tests for unit roots and cointegration, common to other formulations. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II discusses the data and 
empirical methodological issues while Section III presents the empirical results. 
Section IV concludes. 
 
II. DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
Monthly observations for a sample from January 1994 to April 2002 are utilized.3 
The pre-1994 data are avoided due to the measurement biases.4 The 
macro/global funds returns are used to proxy hedge funds activities. This study 
utilizes five different sources of data which are commonly used in the literature 
namely, Investor Force Securities Inc. (IFS), Hedge Fund Research Inc. (HFR), 
Hennesse Group LLC. (HEN), Credit Suisse First Boston/Tremont Index LLC. (TRE) 
and Zurich Capital Market Inc. (ZUR). End of month spot bilateral exchange rates 
vis-à-vis U.S. dollar are from International Financial Statistic and expressed as 
domestic currency per unit of U.S. dollar. The sample period is divided into two 
sub-samples. The pre-crisis period covers from January 1994 to June 1997 during 
which the currencies were relatively stable. The crisis period continues from July 
                                                 
3
 In the case of Malaysia, the post- August 1998 period is avoided due to the imposition of capital 
control which almost completely closed the financial market to foreigners. 
4
 For a complete description of these biases, refer to Fung and Shieh (2002). 
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1997 through April 2002. This period was characterized by massive currencies 
depreciation.  
 
It is well known that in the context of integrated series, the conventional 
application of the F-test (i.e. in a standard VAR model) is invalid5. Moreover, the 
F-test is not valid unless the variables are cointegrated in levels. Recently, an 
alternative approach which utilizes the modified wald (MWALD) test for testing 
linear restriction on the parameters was proposed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) 
- hereafter, TY. The test has an asymptotic χ2 distribution when a VAR (k + dmax) 
is estimated where dmax is the maximum degree of integration suspected to occur 
in the system. Toda and Yamamoto point out that, for d=1, the lag selection 
procedure is always valid since k≥ 1=d. If d=2, then the procedure is valid unless 
k=1. Moreover, the MWALD statistic is valid regardless whether a series is I(0), 
I(1) or I(2), non-cointegrated or cointegrated of an arbitrary order. In addition, 
the MWALD test has a comparable performance in size and power to the 
likelihood ratio (LR) and Wald tests (Zapata and Rambaldi, 1997) 
 
  Rambaldi and Doran (1996) demonstrated that this testing procedure can 
be easily constructed using a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) framework. 
Following TY non-causality test,  these variables can be causally linked in a 
system as follows:6 
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where α0 is an identity matrix and E( )tε = [ tt EXHF εε ]′=0 and E ( ) Σεε ='tt . For 
example, if k=2 and dmax=1, a causality from EX to HF can be established through 
                                                 
5
 Spurious regression due to non-standard distribution of the test statistics, see Toda and Phillips 
(1993). 
6
 Assuming 3-order VAR, where HF=hedge funds; EX=exchange rates.  
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rejecting the null hypothesis of 1tEX −  and 2tEX −  are jointly equal to zero in the 
first equation of the above system. A similar procedure can be used to test the 
causality from HF to EX by establishing a significance of the MWALD statistic 
for a group of lagged HF variables in the second equation of the system.  
 
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Applying the TY procedure outlined in the previous section, the nature of causal 
linkages between the hedge funds and exchange rates is examined. Since the 
appropriate lag length is important to identify the true dynamic of the model, the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian criterion (SBC) lag 
selection criteria are used to determine the optimal lag structure of the VAR 
system. In most cases, the lags suggested by AIC and SBC are the same. Due to 
the importance of serially uncorrelated residuals, higher lag is chosen whenever 
AIC and SBC suggest different lags.  
 
The implementation of the TY procedure involves estimating system 
Equation (1) in the level form. The results are reported in Tables 1 and 2 for the 
baht and ringgit, respectively.   
 
<INSERT TABLE 1> 
 
 
Panels A and B report results for the pre-crisis period and crisis period, 
respectively. Using a 10 percent significant level as a testing criterion, we fail to 
establish the causal relationship from the hedge funds to the baht for the pre-
crisis period. In all cases, the MWALD statistics are too small to reject the null. 
However, there are mixed evidence for the crisis period. In four cases, the null of 
non-causality are rejected. Generally, the findings are suggestive that hedge 
funds Granger-cause baht.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 2> 
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Results in table 2 suggest that there is a strong evidence of causality 
running from hedge funds to ringgit for the pre-crisis period. In four cases, the 
null hypothesis of non-causality can be rejected at the 10 percent level. Thus, we 
can safely conclude that the funds performance contains leading information for 
the ringgit. One of the implications of this finding is that, the funds activities 
contain useful predictive information on the ringgit movements. However, the 
results of the crisis period show that no causal direction from hedge funds to 
ringgit can be established. The MWALD statistic is too small in order to reject the 
null. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION  
This study contributes to the debate on hedge funds and exchange rates in 
Thailand and Malaysia. Monthly observations are utilized for a sample period 
from 1994 to 2001.  In order to better understand the issue, two sub-sample 
periods are created. The pre-crisis period covers from January 1994 to June 1997 
and the crisis period spans from July 1997 to April 2002. A new Granger non-
causality procedure by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) is utilized.  Among the 
findings of interest is that the hedge funds Granger-cause baht during the crisis. 
However, there is no evidence that the funds lead ringgit during the same period 
which suggests that hedge funds activities did not exert significant influence on 
the ringgit. However, the findings for the pre-crisis period suggest that the funds 
contain useful predictive information only on the ringgit.  
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Table 1: The results of Granger non-causality test for the Thai baht.   
 Null Hypothesis 
 HEN−/−>THB IFS−/−>THB HFR −/−>THB TRE−/−>THB ZUR−/−>THB 
      
 A: Pre-crisis period (January 1994 to June 1997) 
MWALD 0.3254 0.9569 2.1255 0.9141 0.4121 
p-value 0.5683 0.3279 0.1448 0.3390 0.5208 
Lag 1 1 1 1 1 
      
 B: Crisis Period (July 1997 to April 2002) 
MWALD 9.0693* 5.3672* 3.5207* 2.6882 5.0534* 
p-value 0.0107 0.0683 0.0606 0.1010 0.0245 
Lag 2 2 1 1 1 
      
Notes:   
* indicate rejection of null hypothesis at the 10% significant level.  
The (−/−>) and (−−−>) indicate does not Granger-cause and Granger-cause, respectively. 
THB = Thai baht  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: The results of Granger non-causality test for the Malaysian ringgit.  
 Null Hypothesis 
 HEN−/−>MYR IFS−/−> MYR HFR−/−>MYR TRE−/−> MYR ZUR−/−>MYR 
      
 A: Pre-crisis period (January 1994 to June 1997) 
MWALD 12.8937* 9.0464* 11.5756* 2.49104 24.7525* 
p-value 0.0003 0.0026 0.0006 0.1145 0.0000 
Lag 1 1 1 1 1 
      
 B: Crisis Period (July 1997 to August 1998) 
MWALD 1.8081 0.4663 1.3927 1.5880 1.4931 
p-value 0.1787 0.4946 0.2379 0.20761 0.2217 
Lag 1 1 1 1 1 
       
Notes:   
* indicate rejection of null hypothesis at the 10% significant level.  
The (−/−>) and (−−−>)  indicate does not Granger-cause and Granger-cause, respectively. 
MYR = Malaysian ringgit  
 
